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Abstract 
The current study focussed on the decision making processes of jurors. The study investigated how 
jurors make a decision, if they integrated information within their decision making process, and if cue 
utilisation thresholds promoted confirmation bias. To do this, 108 participants listened to one of nine 
cases. These participants were asked to give a likelihood of guilt rating after each piece of evidence, to 
state what was the last piece of information they needed to make a decision and give a final verdict at 
the end of a trial. The results highlighted that threshold decision making was being utilised, that 
information integration may allow thresholds to be reached and that thresholds may promote 
confirmation bias to reduce cognitive dissonance. In conclusion, this suggests that jurors integrate 
information until they reach a leading verdict, then the evaluation of information is distorted to support 
the leading threshold. Implications relate to von Dire and legal instructions.  
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Faith in thy Threshold 
The distortion of evidence by jurors could have a disastrous impact on both individuals and 
society. Evidence distortion can be brought about by a specific cognitive bias called 
confirmation bias 1. Confirmation bias relates to individuals perceiving evidence that confirms 
a belief positively and disconfirming evidence negatively 1. Confirmation bias has been cited 
as having a negative influence in the courtroom 2, 3.  David Camm was convicted twice for 
murdering his wife and children. After 13 years in prison, he was finally released after an appeal 
found that the evidence from the prosecution in the previous two trials should have been 
excluded 2, 3. It has been suggested that confirmation bias caused the innocent David Camm to 
be falsely imprisoned 2, 3. The reasoning behind confirmation bias being charged for David 
Camm’s injustice is because Camm’s charges were not dropped despite the prosecution’s 
evidence being found to be unreliable/inaccurate 2. His charges remained, and a trial 
commenced based on the beliefs of the prosecutors rather than the facts.  
It is therefore evident that injustice may be an outcome of a distorted decision making process, 
and this may be caused by confirmation bias 4, 5. Confirmation bias prevents jurors, police 
officers, and judges from using all of the available evidence within a case, thus increasing the 
chances of an error occurring 4. Injustices have a number of significant and negative impacts 
on the legal system. First, an innocent individual has been failed in being given their right to a 
fair defence. Second, a victim has been failed in their right to justice and retribution. Third, a 
guilty perpetrator is still free to recidivate. Finally, the criminal justice system is failing in their 
obligation to society of deterring potential criminals, rehabilitating offenders, and incarcerating 
offenders 6. Confirmation bias undermines justice and the aims of the legal system. 
Confirmation bias occurs when a decision maker searches for information or interprets 
information in a way that supports their initial hypotheses, predictions, and attitudes 4, 1. This 
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bias can skew information search in naturalistic decision making tasks where the decision 
maker can choose which pieces of information they want to use 1.  
Confirmation bias may cause jurors to perceive information that supports their initial 
decision/threshold and/or belief more positively than pieces of evidence that contradicts their 
view 1. A related construct to confirmation bias, pre-decisional distortion, may also occur in 
the courtroom. This is where information is skewed to favour prior biases 7, thereby 
strengthening the effects of confirmation bias. Confirmation bias may also be exaggerated in 
jurors as it has been found that the outcome that is favoured does not distort pre-decisional 
search, but does distort pre-decisional evidence evaluation 8.  
One piece of research from Estrada-Reynolds, Gray, and Nuñez 7 found that prior beliefs (pro-
prosecution, pro-defence and neutral) could forecast the final sentence recommendations given 
by jurors. This highlights that novel evidence is distorted so that it is more in line with the 
leading verdict. Carlson and Russo 9 showed that mock jurors distorted information from a civil 
trial, and that the prior beliefs of the juror (either pro-plaintiffs or pro-defendants) influenced 
the verdicts they finally gave. Interestingly, confidence increased with distortion, thus 
highlighting that evidence distortion and confirmation bias allowed jurors to believe that their 
leading verdicts were the most appropriate verdicts to give 9.  
One potential explanation for confirmation bias relates to cognitive dissonance 10.  Cognitive 
dissonance occurs when the beliefs that a decision maker has and the information (i.e., the new 
competing belief system) that is being supplied to the decision maker contradict one another 
10. This variance between the original belief and the novel information may cause psychological 
and physiological discomfort 11. To reduce this discomfort, the decision maker may try to 
reduce the cognitive dissonance 10. The most ‘cognitively easy’ way to do this is to stop 
searching for disconfirming information, and to focus information search on confirming 
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evidence 10. However, this would not be possible within a courtroom. Instead, jurors may seek 
to reduce their dissonance through viewing confirming evidence more positively than 
disconfirming evidence. Similarly, they may attend more to confirming evidence when making 
a decision and when within the deliberation room 12.  
Some research has found, however, that disconfirming evidence is used when jurors are making 
decisions. Estrada-Reynolds et al.7 aimed to test whether or not death sentence 
recommendations were distorted throughout a capital punishment case in accordance with pre-
trial biases (pro-prosecution, pro-defence or neutral); they did this by asking participants to 
give sentence recommendations (one = more likely to sentence life; and seven = more likely to 
sentence death) at eight separate points in time. Estrada-Reynolds et al.7 found that that 
sentence recommendations were changed in the appropriate direction, sentence 
recommendations increased with prosecution evidence and decreased with defence evidence, 
which does suggest that jurors may integrate information throughout a trial.    
Information integration theory proposes that juror interpretations of the information presented 
in the courtroom can be described by a weighted average of a pre-trial belief alongside the 
probability of guilt inferred by every piece of evidence 13, 14. In this theory, belief of guilt is 
adjusted after each piece of information 13, 14, jurors do not ignore disconfirming evidence 7, 
and through evaluating and integrating evidence a juror is able to make a decision 15. Ostrom 
Werner, and Saks 16 found that jurors start with an innocent-until-proven-guilty belief and that 
said belief is integrated with trial evidence to produce the final verdict. Kaplan and Kemmerick 
17 discovered that both legal and extra-legal (e.g., gender of the defendant) pieces of 
information allow a unitary evaluation of which verdict is most appropriate. Kaplan and Miller 
13 found evidence for the information integration theory through showing that the influence 
that pre-trial biases have could be reduced by increasing the reliability of the information 
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presented in court, thus highlighting that a weighted averaging of prior beliefs and the 
perception of guilt gained from the evidence had occurred.  
In contrast to confirmation bias, the information integration theory would suggest that jurors 
do not ignore or distort information and that information integration occurs, which then 
influences the decision 7. Previous research has found support for both confirmation 
bias/evidence distortion and information integration occurring in jurors 7, 9; therefore, a model 
of decision making that could explain both of these respective information evaluation methods 
would hold great utility. 
One recent explanation for the decision making processes of jurors could be explained using a 
unified Diffusion Threshold Model of decision making 18.  This model allows both rational and 
intuitive processes to be encompassed by having a varying threshold; high thresholds are 
equivalent to rational processing, while low thresholds are equivalent to frugal processing 19. 
In the Diffusion Threshold Model, the decision maker reaches their relative threshold through 
information integration 20. Therefore, the information integration theory fits well with the 
Diffusion Threshold Model in that both suggest that information integration allow a decision 
to be made.  
Previous research that supports the information integration theory within juror decision 
making, such as Kaplan and Miller 13, also supports the Diffusion Threshold Models use of 
information integration to explain how thresholds are reached. However, the Diffusion 
Threshold Model discussed differs from the information integration theory in one important 
way. In the information integration theory, a decision cannot be made until all of information 
has been integrated 7, whereas in the Diffusion Threshold Model, information integration may 
only occur until a threshold has been reached 20; this difference is more apparent within a juror 
context than it is within everyday decision making. In everyday decision making environments, 
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the Diffusion Threshold Model would propose that individuals integrate available information 
until a threshold is reached, which would stop information search, and an outcome would then 
be chosen 20. Juror decision making differs from everyday decision making though, as jurors 
do not control when information search/presentation is halted: lawyers and judges have control 
over the quantity of information shown in court.  
Simon 21 suggested that when making decisions our cognition and environment interact. 
Consequently, jurors may still integrate information until a threshold has been reached; 
however, the environmental control over information search/presentation may have an impact 
on what occurs post-threshold. This difference in regard to what occurs once a threshold has 
been reached may explain why jurors have been found to be anxious about their decision 
making 22, as decision making that occurs every day may not be challenged post-threshold, 
whereas juror decision making may be. Decision makers in non-legal environments are not 
forced fed information (both confirming and disconfirming) once a threshold is reached, 
meaning that anxiety and regret does not have the chance to arise. Conversely, jurors may be 
provided with information post-threshold, which then allows disconfirming evidence to 
challenge the current threshold, meaning that anxiety or cognitive dissonance may occur 10 
The above paragraph raises an important question: what happens to the evidence presented 
once the last threshold has been reached? Previous research would propose that confirmation 
bias and evidence distortion might occur. There are a number of reasons for this. First, the 
reaching of a threshold may create a hypothesis in the juror (e.g., “the defendant is guilty”), 
which may promote belief persistence and cause beliefs to remain despite the presence of 
disconfirming evidence 4. Second, the belief associated with the threshold may be challenged 
by disconfirming evidence, thus stimulating cognitive dissonance 10, which may lead to 
confirmation bias and evidence distortion to decrease said dissonance. Finally, Carlson and 
Russo9 provide evidence of pre-decisional distortion in jurors, finding that juror interpretations 
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of new pieces of evidence were biased in order to support leading verdicts. Thresholds and 
leading verdicts are equivalent, as both represent tentative verdicts that are favoured by a juror 
during a trial 9, which suggests that thresholds may also promote evidence distortion. 
Furthermore, it seems likely that after a threshold is crossed, information may be distorted to 
support the verdict that corresponds to a particular threshold. 
The Diffusion Threshold Model may therefore have two stages within a juror context: 1) an 
information integration stage that allows a threshold to be reached, and 2) an information 
distortion stage that allows the threshold to be supported. The first stage of this model is based 
upon traditional Diffusion Threshold Models, where thresholds are reached through 
information integration 20. The second stage is based upon Carlson and Russo’s 9 research, 
where leading verdicts were shown to cause evidence distortion. These two stages may make 
the Diffusion Threshold Model a more realistic and global model within a juror decision 
making context, as both information integration and evidence distortion has been found in 
previous juror decision making research 1, 7. The current study has two main questions to test: 
‘1) does information integration allow thresholds to be reached?’ and ‘2) does the reaching of 
a threshold promote evidence distortion?’.  
 
Method 
 Design. 
 This quasi-experimental design adopted a 2 x 3 x 2 mixed design, where threshold (pre- and 
post-threshold) and evidence type (prior (before any evidence was shown), prosecution and 
defence) were altered within-subjects factors, and verdict given (Guilty vs. Not Guilty) was a 
between-subjects factor. The response measure here was the likelihood of guilt ratings. 
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Participants. 
 
One hundred and eight participants took part (12 people per vignette over nine vignettes; 73 
female). The age range was 18–57 years, and the mean age was 26.1 (SD = 8.32) years old. 
Sixty-nine of the participants identified as students. Exclusion criteria included: people who 
were not on the electoral role; people who were not native to the UK; and those who did not 
have a visa. This was to ensure that the participants in this study were as close to a real life 
British jury population as possible. Opportunistic sampling was used, which included 
participants being recruited from websites (e.g., Facebook).  
 
Materials. 
Vignettes. 
Nine vignettes were used in the current study and participants heard one of these vignettes 
each. This increased the generalisability of the current study as each vignette varied in relation 
to the evidence, the defendant and the victim. In addition, by reducing the number of vignettes 
each participant was presented with, it countered a criticism of the last quasi-experiment, as it 
was reported by the previous studies participants that too many vignettes were shown. 
Vignette construction. 
Nine separate vignettes were developed through consulting literature on vignette development 
(i.e., Ashill and Yavas 23; Heverly, Fitt, and Newman 24). The vignettes were developed to be 
short (eight pieces of information and two closing statements) and representative of court trials 
25. The vignettes in the current study were fictitious, but the structure and the evidence used in 
the vignettes were representative of previous court trials. This was ensured through the 
researcher consulting newspaper materials, court transcripts and visiting the High Court in 
Edinburgh. In addition, the vignettes were designed to be consistent, as all the victims were 
female, all the defendants were male, and all of the charges were homicide, which should 
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prevent confounding variables, such as crime type and gender bias, from having a negative 
impact on the study. 
The type of information presented, and the order of the information was kept constant 
throughout the vignettes.  This was to ensure that the vignettes were relatively similar. For 
example, participants first heard an opening statement from a judge, which provided contextual 
information, such as the name of the victim and the defendant. The first piece of evidence that 
participants were given was eyewitness testimony from the prosecution, which was then 
followed by a rebuttal from the defence. Participants then heard special witness testimony that 
supported the prosecution. This was followed by the defence’s attempt to discredit the special 
witness’s evidence in order to create reasonable doubt. The participants were then provided 
with a secondary confession (i.e., motive), which was discredited by the defence in the 
following piece of evidence. After this, the prosecution provided participants with information 
that highlighted that the defendant lacked an alibi. The defence rebutted this with a possible 
alibi, usually placing the whereabouts of the defendant in a location different from the victim. 
Finally, participants heard a closing statement from the prosecution, which was followed by a 
closing statement from the defence. The pieces of evidence, mentioned above, were selected 
as they had been used in previous forensic decision making experiments and are used in 
homicide trials 26, 27, 28.   
Vignettes were designed to be of similar lengths in order for attentional biases to be reduced. 
The average word length of the vignettes was 704.11 (minimum = 606; maximum = 773; SD 
= 57.57).  
The structure (i.e., prosecution evidence followed by defence evidence) of the vignettes were 
designed in a way to allow them to be ambiguous. This was conducted for two reasons. First, 
because court trials are inherently ambiguous, therefore juror vignettes should be equally 
ambiguous 29, 30. Second, because ambiguity breeds bias, consequently ambiguous vignettes 
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are the best way to investigate decision making biases 31. In addition, the structure was chosen 
for ecological validity purposes, as prosecution evidence is followed by defence evidence in 
real life court trials.  
 
Audio recording device. 
The vignettes were recorded in order to make the experiment more ecologically valid, as real 
jurors would listen to listen to the evidence presented in court. Therefore, in the current study, 
participants listened to the vignettes and did not read them. The vignettes were recorded with 
a voice actor in a quiet room at Edinburgh Napier University. The researcher used the audio 
recording app Dictaphone – Audio Recorder on an iPhone 5 to record the vignettes. The audio 
recording was then edited on a program named Audacity. The average length of the audio 
vignettes was four minutes 16 seconds (minimum =3.48; maximum = 4.50; SD = .38).  
 
Audio playback device. 
The audio vignettes were saved as an mp3 file, and played out of Windows Media Player. The 
participants heard the vignettes from Labtec Spin 95 speakers. 
 
Verdict judgments. 
Once participant had heard all the evidence available, they were asked to give a final verdict. 
Only two-verdict options were available here, participants could only give a Guilty or a Not 
Guilty verdict, thus creating the between-subjects factor of verdict given.  
 
Threshold. 
Participants were asked to state the last piece of information from the vignette that they needed 
to make a decision, this piece of information was marked as their threshold. For example, 
participants may after hear DNA evidence and this may allow them to favour a Guilty verdict 
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(i.e., reach a Guilty threshold). Therefore, it can be said that the DNA evidence allowed the 
Guilty threshold to be reached, and this threshold point can be measured by asking participants 
to state what the last piece of information they needed was to reach a decision, as it highlights 
when a Guilty verdict was initially preferred. Any responses (i.e., likelihood of guilt ratings) 
given both at and before this point were categorised in the pre-threshold condition, and any 
responses given after this point were marked within the post-threshold condition, thus allowing 
the within-subjects factor of threshold to be created.  
 
Likelihood rating scale and cue utilisation. 
Likelihood of guilty ratings varied between 0-100, with higher ratings suggesting a higher 
perception of guilt surrounding the defendant.  Participants were asked to state a likelihood of 
guilt rating after the prior point, after each piece of evidence, and after each of the closing 
statements.  
 
Demographics questionnaire. 
 
The demographics questionnaire asked participants to state their: 1) age, 2) gender, and, 3) 
occupation.  
 
Information sheet, consent form and debrief.  
All participants received a standardised information sheet and consent form prior to 
participation in this study, and a debriefing sheet at the end. These materials made participants 
aware of exclusion/ inclusion criteria and ethical issues. 
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Procedure. 
Participants read the standardised information sheet and completed the consent form within a 
laboratory room in the Psychology Laboratory at Edinburgh Napier University. Once the 
consent form was signed, participants filled out the demographics questionnaire. The 
researcher then played the recording of the opening statement to participants. The participants 
were then asked to state a prior likelihood of guilt rating (i.e., a likelihood of guilt rating given 
before any evidence has been provided); this was recorded by the researcher. Participants then 
heard the first piece of evidence, which was always a piece of eyewitness testimony supporting 
the prosecution, and were asked to state another likelihood of guilt rating, which was also 
recorded by the participant. This basic procedure was then repeated for the remaining seven 
pieces of evidence (three for the prosecution and four for the defence).  
Once all of the evidence had been presented, participants were played closing statements from 
both the prosecution (first) and the defence. These closing statements were also rated in relation 
to likelihood of guilt ratings. After the closing statements, participants were asked to give a 
verdict: Guilty or Not Guilty. Then, participants were asked to identify the last piece of 
evidence that they needed to make their decision (i.e., they state their threshold). By asking 
participants to state this, it allowed the researchers to identify the piece of evidence that allowed 
a verdict preference to be initiated. Once the participants had finished, they were given a debrief 
sheet. The task took on average 20 minutes to complete.  
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Results 
Table 1
Generalised Estimating Equation (GEE) analysis for testing information integration 
and confirmation bias. 
 
A Generalised Estimating Equation (GEE) was used to analyse the current data. A GEE is a 
type of analysis that has been used to analyse repeated measures designs, longitudinal data, and 
data that are correlated, and was developed to allow repeated measures data that is not normally 
distributed, or does not meet parametric assumptions, to be analysed 7. 
 
The selection of a correlation matrix.  
 
The corrected quasi-likelihood under independence model criterion (QICC) in the Goodness 
of fit box was lower for the independent correlation matrix (QICC = 603630.99) than it was 
for the unstructured (QICC = 648204.98), auto-regressive (QICC = 627448.46) and 
exchangeable (QICC = 603689.18) correlation matrices; indicating that the model was a better 
fit when an independent correlation matrix was used. Therefore, the independent correlation 
matrix was utilised. 
 
GEE analysis of the likelihood of guilt values across threshold, evidence type and verdict given.  
 
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 23 was used to analyse the data. 
The GEE compared the factors of threshold (pre and post), evidence type (prior, prosecution 
and defence) and verdict given (Guilty and Not Guilty) across the response measure of 
likelihood of guilt: for more information on the factors (or explanatory variables) and response 
variables please see the methods section, specifically the design and materials section. For 
summary table of model output please see table.1. 
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Table 1 
Summary Table of model output.    
Variable Wald Chi-Square 
Degrees of 
Freedom P value 
Intercept 1256.73 1 <.001 
Verdict Type 1250.2 1 <.001 
Threshold 1114.38 1 <0.04 
Evidence type 1276.38 2 <.001 
Evidence Type* Verdict Given * 
Threshold 1129.25 5 <.001 
 
Verdict type was found to have a significant main effect on the likelihood of guilt ratings [Wald 
X² (1) = 50.20, p <.001]. Guilty verdicts (Estimated Marginal Means (EEM) = 65.43) had a 
higher likelihood of guilt rating in comparison to Not Guilty verdicts (EMM = 44.65).  
Threshold was found to be having a significant main effect on likelihood of guilt ratings [Wald 
X² (1) = 4.38, p =.04]. It was shown that the likelihood of guilt ratings were higher post-
threshold (EMM = 62.28) in comparison to pre-threshold (EMM = 50.21). Evidence type was 
also found to have a significant main effect on likelihood of guilt ratings [Wald X² (2) = 276.38, 
p <.001].  The prior point (EMM = 34.85) had a significantly lower likelihood of guilt rating 
in comparison to the defence evidence condition (EMS = 54.64; p <.001). The likelihood of 
guilt rating for the defence evidence condition was significantly lower in comparison to the 
prosecution evidence condition (EMM = 65.53; p <.001). The prior point also had a 
significantly lower likelihood of guilt rating in comparison to the prosecution evidence 
condition (p <.001).  
A significant interaction was found between the variables of evidence type, verdict given and 
threshold [Wald X² (5) = 29.25, p <.001]. Sidak post hoc tests were used in the current study 
as they avoid type 1 errors, they can take into account uneven conditions (i.e., less conservative 
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than Bonferroni tests), and they keep more statistical power in comparison to the Least 
Significant Difference Test (LSD). See figures 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 for a visual illustration of the 
interactions found between the factors of evidence type, threshold and verdict given.  
 
Figure 1. Interaction between evidence type and verdict given within the pre-threshold condition. 
 
Figure 1 shows that in the pre-threshold condition, prosecution evidence generated 
significantly higher likelihood of guilt ratings in Guilty verdicts in comparison to Not Guilty 
verdicts.  
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Figure 2. Interaction between evidence type and verdict given in the post-threshold condition. 
 
Figure 2 highlights that in the post-threshold condition, both prosecution and defence evidence 
generated significantly higher likelihood of guilt ratings when a Guilty verdict was given in 
comparison to when a Not Guilty verdict was given, thus suggesting that thresholds may 
promote confirmation bias.  
     
*<.05, 
**<.01, 
***<.001. 
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Figure 3. Interaction between threshold condition and evidence type in Guilty verdicts. 
 
Figure 3 shows that in Guilty verdicts, both prosecution and defence evidence generated 
significantly higher likelihood of guilt ratings post-threshold in comparison to pre-threshold, 
thus suggesting that thresholds may promote confirmation bias. 
*<.05, 
**<.01, 
***<.001. 
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Figure 4. Interaction between evidence type and threshold condition in Not Guilty verdicts. 
 
Figure 4 highlights that there was no significant differences between the pre-threshold and 
post-threshold likelihood of guilt ratings, for both prosecution and defence evidence, when a 
Not Guilty verdict was given.  
*<.05, 
**<.01, 
***<.001. 
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Figure 5. Interaction between evidence type, verdict given and threshold condition across the likelihood 
of guilt measure. 
 
Figure 5 highlights that regardless of threshold condition or verdict given, defence evidence 
generated significantly lower likelihood of guilt ratings in comparison to prosecution evidence, 
thus suggesting that information integration occurred throughout juror decision processes. 
Discussion 
Statement of principal findings 
The current study had two main questions to test: ‘1) does information integration allow 
thresholds to be reached?’ and ‘2) does the reaching of a threshold promote evidence 
distortion?’. The results highlighted that regardless of the threshold condition (pre vs. post) or 
the verdict given (Guilty vs. Not Guilty), prosecution evidence generated higher likelihood of 
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guilt ratings than defence evidence. These results support information integration and similar 
findings have been found in previous juror research. For instance, Estrada-Reynolds et al.7 
found that jurors in a death penalty case increased their sentence recommendations with 
prosecution evidence, and decreased their sentence recommendations with defence evidence. 
Kaplan and Miller 13 found that jurors integrate pre-trial biases and evidence from a trial when 
reaching a verdict. They also found that biases could be attenuated by increasing the strength 
of the evidence in court, which provides further evidence for information integration, as the 
integration of strong evidence counteracts the effects of pre-trial biases. The current results, 
therefore, are in line with previous research relating to information integration theory.  
In relation to the first research aim, it is interesting that in the pre-threshold condition that 
prosecution evidence generated significantly higher likelihood of guilt ratings than defence 
evidence, regardless of the verdict given. These results suggest that jurors integrate information 
(increase with prosecution evidence and decrease with defence evidence), and that this 
information integration allows threshold to be reached. This is the first direct evidence of 
information integration allowing thresholds to be reached within a juror decision making 
setting. However, Ratcliff and Smith 20 did provide evidence of the same process occurring in 
perceptual decision making tasks.  
The current study found that the variables of verdict given, evidence type, and threshold all 
significantly interacted with one another when producing likelihood of guilt ratings, which 
highlighted that juror’s perceptions of guilt, based on the evidence presented, were altered 
depending on the threshold (i.e., Guilty threshold versus Not Guilty threshold) that was 
reached, thus suggesting that thresholds may promote confirmation bias. Each of the main 
findings will now be discussed.  
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First, it was found that regardless of the evidence type (prosecution and defence evidence) 
likelihood of guilt ratings were higher for Guilty verdicts post-threshold than they were for Not 
Guilty verdicts post-threshold, which suggested that confirmation bias was present. This 
suggests that when a Guilty threshold is reached that prosecution evidence is seen positively to 
confirm said threshold, and defence evidence is either disregarded (and does not affect the drift 
of the decision maker) or is distorted to support the current threshold 1. When a Not Guilty 
threshold was reached, the opposite pattern may have occurred, with defence evidence being 
seen more favourably than prosecution evidence, thus causing the latter evidence type to either 
be disregarded or distorted to support the current threshold.  
The current results are consistent with a number of pieces of previous research. Carlson and 
Russo 9 found that once jurors reached a leading verdict (i.e., threshold) then they distorted 
novel evidence to support said verdict. Ask, Rebelius, and Granhag 26 discovered that 
participants in a homicide trial rated disconfirming evidence as less reliable than confirming 
evidence. Smith and Bull 32 highlighted that individuals with a pro-prosecution bias towards 
forensic evidence perceived weak DNA evidence to be strong. When interpreting the current 
study’s results in light of previous research, it is clear that once a juror has acquired a preference 
for a certain verdict through reaching a threshold, they will perceive supporting evidence 
positively 32, and disconfirming evidence will either be seen as less reliable 26 or will be 
distorted to support the current threshold/leading verdict9.  
Second, it was found that when a Guilty verdict was given that the likelihood of guilt ratings 
were significantly higher post-threshold in comparison to pre-threshold, regardless of evidence 
type. This suggests two things: 1) that jurors integrate more information pre-threshold than 
they do post-threshold; and 2) that in Guilty verdicts the evidence is perceived to support the 
prosecution more post-threshold in comparison to pre-threshold. In addition, the fact that this 
preference for the prosecution occurred regardless of the evidence type, suggests that defence 
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evidence was being distorted, or disregarded, to support the leading verdict 9. The current 
results highlighted that thresholds may act as a catalyst for confirmation bias and evidence 
distortion.   
Thresholds may promote confirmation bias/evidence distortion through cognitive dissonance 
4. Thresholds may symbolise the point where a juror generates a belief surrounding their 
preferred verdict (Guilty or Not Guilty), and once this belief is generated, it is open to attack 
from novel information that supplies competing belief systems. Cognitive dissonance may then 
occur in the juror as results of these conflicting beliefs of guilt 10. For example, if a juror reaches 
a Guilty threshold and defence evidence is then presented, the juror may become victim to 
cognitive dissonance. The juror may then try to reduce this discomfort by distorting or 
disregarding disconfirming evidence, thus promoting confirmation bias. In addition, once a 
threshold is reached and a verdict belief is acquired, jurors may interpret novel information in 
line with their current threshold, which may then cause them to fall prey to confirmation bias 
4; see Figure 6 for visual illustration of how thresholds may promote confirmation bias.  
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Figure 6. A threshold effect on novel evidence. 
It was found in Not Guilty verdicts, however, that no significant differences existed in relation 
to likelihood of guilt ratings, for both evidence types, when comparing the pre-threshold 
condition with the post threshold condition. One explanation for this lack of significance is that 
the drift (perception of guilt) in Not Guilty verdicts was already low from an early stage in the 
decision making process, which may have caused a floor effect. This floor effect may have 
stopped the decline of likelihood of guilt ratings in the post-threshold condition, when 
compared to the likelihood of guilt ratings given in the pre-threshold condition, from reaching 
significance. Pre-trial biases may explain why some jurors (i.e., the ones that gave Not Guilty 
verdicts) perceived the defendant to be innocent from the beginning of the vignettes 33. Previous 
research has shown that pre-trial biases influence juror perceptions of guilt at the beginning of 
a trial 34, and these pre-trial biases then affect how jurors interpret evidence throughout a trial 
32.  In summary, pre-trial biases may have caused the jurors who gave Not Guilty verdicts in 
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the current study to be biased towards the defence from the beginning of the vignettes and to 
have low perceptions of guilt throughout said vignettes, which may have produced a floor effect 
when comparing the pre- and post-threshold conditions in relation to the likelihood of guilt 
ratings.  
The results highlights that prosecution evidence generated significantly higher likelihood of 
guilt ratings in the post-threshold condition than defence evidence, regardless of verdict type. 
However, in the post-threshold condition both prosecution and defence evidence generated 
significantly higher likelihood of guilt ratings in Guilty verdicts than they did in Not Guilty 
verdicts (as mentioned above). These results taken together show two things: 1) that evidence 
is distorted to confirm the threshold that is reached; and, 2) that information integration occurs 
post-threshold.  
These findings are similar to those found by Estrada-Reynolds et al.7, as their research provided 
evidence for both information integration and evidence distortion. However, Estrada-Reynolds 
et al.7 could not adequately explain the dissonance in their findings. The current study proposes 
that once a threshold is reached that a juror generates a belief surrounding which verdict they 
prefer, thus causing cognitive dissonance (as stated above), and that disconfirming evidence 
can be distorted to reduce cognitive dissonance. Nevertheless, in some scenarios the evidence 
(e.g., DNA evidence) may be too strong to ignore or distort 26. The juror may then integrate 
said piece of evidence into their perception of guilt without changing their leading 
verdict/threshold, thus reducing cognitive dissonance through, limited, information integration. 
If the evidence is strong enough, it may be possible for verdict reversals to occur, although this 
enquiry is outwith the scope of the current study.  
Overall, the current study highlighted that jurors integrated information until they reached a 
threshold 20. This threshold then acted as a leading verdict, which competed with novel belief 
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systems provided by new evidence 10. To reduce the cognitive dissonance formed by these 
competing beliefs, evidence was distorted to support the leading threshold. Some information 
integration may have occurred post-threshold as to integrate strong pieces of evidence within 
the decision process, without causing verdict reversals.  
Strengths and weaknesses of the study 
One limitation relates to how the threshold variable was measured. Participants were asked to 
state the last piece of information they needed to make a decision, and this response was used 
to create the threshold variable. However, participants may have fallen prey to hindsight bias, 
and this may have caused them to overestimate how early they reached their threshold 35. The 
current study could not have investigated information integration or the influence of thresholds 
on evidence distortion without asking participants to state both likelihood of guilt ratings after 
each piece of evidence and the last piece of information they needed to make their decision.  
Meaning of the study: possible mechanisms and implications for clinicians or 
policymakers 
One implication from the current piece of research is that thresholds may allow confirmation 
/evidence distortion to occur, as thresholds may symbolise the first time a juror creates a belief 
regarding which verdict they prefer. This promotion of confirmation bias may impede on the 
legal system’s ability to deliver justice to society, and may make the trial by jury process unfair 
for legal actors (i.e., the prosecution and the defence). To prevent said negative effects, 
thresholds with a high cue utilisation (i.e., using all the evidence in a trial) should be promoted. 
Judges do currently instruct jurors to only make a verdict once they have heard all of the 
evidence provided in court, but these instructions are normally given once all the evidence has 
already been presented 36. Therefore, the current study would propose that jurors be given said 
instructions at the beginning of a trial9, as this may help to stop thresholds being reached 
28 
 
prematurely and may attenuate confirmation bias in jurors. In addition, the current research, 
and similar research, should be used by judges to highlight to jurors the dangers of reaching a 
threshold (i.e., favouring a verdict) before all the evidence has been heard9. 
Unanswered questions and future research 
Despite meeting the research aims/questions of the thesis so far, many questions have been left 
unanswered or have indeed been raised by the findings of the current study. One variable that 
was not tested in the current study relates to pre-trial biases. Estrada-Reynolds et al. 7 showed 
that pre-trial biases (pro-prosecution, neutral and pro-defence) did allow verdicts to be 
forecasted. Pre-trial biases may also predict the thresholds that participants are likely to reach 
and how much information they may need to reach these thresholds. Future research is needed 
to test this. In addition, the Scottish legal system with its Not Proven verdict is a unique legal 
system that has not been extensively research. Consequently, it would be interesting to 
investigate if Not proven verdicts are reached using this threshold mechanism and if the 
inclusion of the Not Proven verdict has any attenuating effects on confirmation bias.  
The current piece of research has shown two things: 1) that information integration allowed 
thresholds to be reached; and 2) that confirmation bias may be promoted by a threshold being 
reached. The results highlight that in the pre-threshold condition, prosecution evidence 
generated significantly higher likelihoods of guilt ratings in comparison to defence evidence 
(regardless of verdict type), which suggested that information integration allowed thresholds 
to be reached. It was also found that regardless of evidence type (prosecution and defence), 
likelihood of guilt ratings were significantly higher for Guilty verdicts post-threshold than they 
were for Not Guilty verdicts post-threshold, thus highlighting that confirmation bias may be 
promoted through a threshold being reached. In addition, the results show that in Guilty 
verdicts both evidence types generated significantly higher likelihood of guilt ratings post-
threshold in comparison to pre-threshold, which once again suggest that confirmation bias 
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might be promoted through a threshold being reached. The current study suggests that the trial 
by jury process should be amended to increase thresholds in relation to cue utilisation, thus 
allowing confirmation bias to be attenuated.  
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